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FOREWORD
The world is waiting for peace in the Middle East. At
present the possibility of a settlement is delayed by differences
between Israel and Syria. The two are far apart on how to solve
one of the thornier problems of the negotiations--the eventual
status of the Golan Heights.
That Syria's President Assad and Israel's Prime Minister
Rabin should find themselves in disagreement is not unusual-Israel and Syria have been enemies for years. But that Assad
should be able to hold out against Israeli power is quite
extraordinary.
Assad has played an extremely astute game of diplomatic
intrigue against the Israelis, with successes far beyond anything
one might have imagined. This study shows how the Syrian was able
to improve his originally weak position in the peace talks by
exploiting crisis conditions in Lebanon.
Assad's major weapon against the Israelis has been the
guerrilla group Hizbollah. The author claims that the fact that a
small group of guerrillas could have such an enormous impact in
this international drama reveals changed power relations in the
strategic Middle East.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
analysis as a contribution to the debate on the peace process and
on this important region.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This study considers the remarkable performance of Syria's
President Hafez al Assad, who took what apparently was a bankrupt
negotiating stance in the Arab-Israeli peace talks and turned it
into a position of strength.
What enabled Assad to make this extraordinary turnaround was
a correct analysis of power relations in the Middle East. In
particular Assad seems to have been among the first Middle East
politicians to recognize the potential of groups like Hizbollah,
which has for over a decade now been carrying on a fierce
guerrilla war against Israel in southern Lebanon. The study
examines why Israeli society is vulnerable to the Hizbollahis,
and how this vulnerability has played into Assad's hands.
The study also considers the arguments of those who oppose
making concessions to Assad, because, they claim, his position at
home is so weak that he would be unable to deliver on any deal
that he might make.
The study concludes with a look at the anarchic conditions
in Lebanon and ponders whether the radical forces set loose there
can ever again be brought under control.
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ASSAD AND THE PEACE PROCESS:
THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF LEBANON
Introduction.
Syrian President Hafez Assad has established himself as the
virtual arbiter of the peace process; whether the process
succeeds or fails to a large extent depends on him. Given the
difficulties that Assad confronted when the talks first began 4
years ago, it is extraordinary that he has been able to maneuver
himself into this position.
This study attempts to show how he did it, and, in the
process, clarify the realities of power in the Middle East.
According to the author, with the coming of groups like Hizbollah
the Middle East power balance has changed, and U.S. policymakers
need to appreciate this fact if they are not to be overwhelmed by
the new situation that has come into being.
At the start of the peace process Israel appeared to be
holding all of the cards, and thus saw itself under no compulsion
to make accommodations to its enemies. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Israel's main antagonist, Syria, was bereft of
international support; it could not look to Moscow to bolster its
weak position.
Along with that, Syria could not hope to coerce the Israelis
by holding out the threat of resumed hostilities. After Egypt had
concluded a separate peace with the Jewish state, Syria's ability
to make war was severely compromised.
Given this situation (Syria's loss of Soviet patronage and
its inability to play the war card), the peace process appeared,
from the Israelis' standpoint, to be a win-win situation.
However it has not evolved that way. It is now apparent that
it is Tel Aviv, not Damascus, that is most anxious for a
settlement; the Israeli government is the one that is importuning
1
the United States to move the talks along. Assad has held back,
refusing to cooperate unless and until he can obtain his minimum
requirement. Assad wants the Golan Heights back (after Damascus
lost it to Israel in 1967).
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Israel's leaders are loath to hand it over--at least all at
once. They have hinted that they might be willing to return it
incrementally (the Israeli Defense Force [IDF] could make staged
withdrawals from the Heights over a period of, say, 3-8 years).
That, for Assad, is not good enough; he wants an almost immediate
withdrawal of the Israeli forces. The maximum waiting period that
he is willing to entertain is 1 year. Assad's position is that
Syrian sovereignty must be reestablished over the Heights by the
close of 1995. Where did Assad get the idea that he could hold
out like this?
The study will argue that Syria's grip on Lebanon is what
gives Assad leverage over the Israelis. Lebanon, the arena from
which numerous guerrilla groups operate, is crucial to Israel's
2
hopes of making peace with its neighbors. One of these groups,
Hizbollah, has proved extraordinarily effective. The Hizbollahis
seem able to embarrass the IDF, sometimes with seeming impunity.
Assad has used this group--along with others--to put pressure on
Tel Aviv, and induce it to bargain on a more or less equal basis
at the peace table.
The study starts with a look at Lebanon's unique political
environment, since this provided Assad the opening to dominate
Lebanon's political life, and subsequently to turn the situation
there to his uses.
Lebanon and the Peace Process.
Lebanon is governed by a system called confessionalism,
under which all of the major religious sects in the country share
3
in its rule. Each sect puts forward a representative for one of
Lebanon's top political posts, and that individual uses his
office to dispense privileges to his co-religionists.
Today, in Lebanon, power is shared among the sects on a more
4
or less equal basis. However, as originally conceived,
confessionalism favored the politically dominant Christian
community. The other sects--the Druze, the Sunni and the Shia
Muslims--were involved in decisions affecting the national
welfare; however, in the end, the Christians determined the
actual decision making. This unique situation, where one group
(the Christians), came to dominate was established by the French.
They did this as part of the peace settlement after World War I.
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The French and British devised the so-called system of mandates
at the San Remo conference, one of several international fora
called to work out the peace settlement after the Great War. At
San Remo, the Allies decided that communities previously
controlled by the Ottoman Empire would be reconstituted as socalled mandate territories. Supposedly, the Europeans would tutor
the territories, preparing them for self-rule. In fact, to all
intents they became the Europeans' possessions.
In the case of Lebanon, the French wanted a Christian entity
that would offset the power of the predominant Muslim
communities, and so they detached a Christian enclave from
greater Syria and made it into a separate state. The Syrians
objected to this; however the French, who had been given the
mandate for Syria, compelled their submission, and so the
arrangement was allowed to stand.
Then, in World War II, Vichy France sided with the Axis
powers, and as a result the United States and Britain stripped
the French of their mandate over not only Lebanon but Syria as
well. Lebanon became independent, but the Lebanese, among
themselves, arranged matters so that the same system of rule was
preserved; that is, Lebanon remained a Christian-dominated
5
state. And this arrangement was codified by making it a law that
the president of the country would always be Christian;
specifically he had to come from the so-called Maronite
6
community. Also, because they remained the most numerous group
in Lebanon after World War II, the Christians got the most seats
in Parliament.
Years passed and the system never lapsed, even though most
of the points on which it was premised had changed. The most
important shift was in the area of demographics--the Christians
ceased to be the most numerous group; the Muslims, and in
particular the Shia Muslims, overtook them, but rather than
tinker with the system--much less drastically change it--the
7
Lebanese stopped taking a census count. They maintained the
fiction that the old numerical superiority of the Christians was
still in force. Therefore, the Christians were entitled to run
the country.
One might ask why the Lebanese clung to this artificial
political construct? The answer would appear to be that under it
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the economy did well; indeed, the Lebanese economy, pre-1970s,
was a wonder. For a country so tiny, Lebanon was rich, certainly
richer than the countries surrounding it. Syria, Israel, Jordan-none were in a league with it. The Lebanese miracle, as it was
called, was based largely on this fact of Christian dominance.
Because of this, Western businessmen made their headquarters
there, and also--and this is most important--they did their
banking there. In addition, Lebanon benefited from a steady flow
of remittances from Lebanese living overseas. (Another great
source of income was the Persian Gulf. We will be discussing this
in more detail below.)
As long as money flowed into Lebanon, and as long as
everyone was more or less taken care of--that is, had a job and
was reasonably secure--the system, even though inequitable
politically, survived. However, problems became manifest as far
back as 1948 with the arrival in Lebanon of Palestinian refugees
of the first Arab-Israeli War. Some 100,000 Palestinians came to
Lebanon because they had nowhere else to go. With nothing but a
few possessions they had been able to salvage from the wreck of
that war, these people were destitute. The Lebanese did not
welcome the Palestinians; rather they exploited them shamefully.
The Lebanese used the Palestinians as a source of cheap labor,
and this persisted until the fateful period of the 1970s.
In 1970, clashes between the Palestinians living in Jordan
and the government there produced a new exodus. Another 100,000
fled into Lebanon, and this lot was entirely different from the
8
first, the 1948 cohort. The Palestinian refugees in 1970
considered themselves fighters. In Jordan they had functioned as
guerrillas and they were determined to carry on their fight
against Israel from their new home in exile.
The newly arrived Palestinians settled in the south of
Lebanon, just over the Israeli border since from there they could
conduct fedayeen raids against the Israeli nahals (paramilitary
settlements) in Galilee. Ordinarily, cross-border raiding of this
kind would be interdicted by the country's rulers. But in
Lebanon's case, there was no adequate military to perform such
9
interdiction, and so the raiding went unchecked.
To be sure, the raids were not very effective. Still, they
brought fierce retaliation from the Israelis. The latter bombed
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and strafed the Palestinian camps in southern Lebanon and, in the
10
process, inevitably some local communities were hit. The
communities comprised mainly Shias, the poorest and most backward
11
politically of all the sects. These people were unhappy with
having the Palestinians in their midst, especially after the
Israeli retaliatory raids commenced, but there was not a great
deal that they could do about it. The Palestinians remained a
force in the south and--being an enterprising people--gradually
took over more and more of the country. They did not seek power
within the Lebanese system (for the reason that they hoped one
day to return to their homes in the Israeli-controlled
territories). However, they created a mini-state in Lebanon. They
had their own hospitals, clinics and businesses; they set up
schools and established welfare schemes, all to benefit
themselves; native Lebanese had no share in this. In this sense
the phenomenal growth of the Palestinian community was
parasitical. The Palestinians poached on resources of the
Lebanese, but did not contribute much, if anything, to the
overall society.
The Christians, more than any, despised the Palestinians,
and were outspoken in their contempt. They, alone among the
Lebanese communities, were not awed by the self-proclaimed
fedayeen fighters. (For a diagram of the various religious
enclaves within Lebanon, see Figure 1.) The other groups, the
Sunni Muslims, the Druze, and even the Shias--all were mindful of
the special political role the Palestinians played; that is, they
embodied the Arabs' grievance against Israel; they were the
vanguard of the Arab struggle against the Jewish state. The
Christians, however, did not think of themselves as Arabs; rather
they believed themselves to be the descendants of the ancient
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Phoenicians. This was somewhat far fetched; still, the Christians
12
believed it. We can see, therefore, why the special character of
the Palestinians as the vanguard fighters of the Arabs would be
lost on the Christians.
Ultimately, the Christians and the Palestinians came into
conflict, and with that the fragile Lebanese system fell apart.
Assad was able to exploit this crisis to aggrandize his power
position in the area.
Birth of a Movement.
Beginning from roughly the 1960s, various leftist groups in
Lebanon had tried to mobilize the population against the
country's ruling elite. These efforts consistently were
frustrated. The power of the feudal lords was too great; moreover
(as we have already indicated) the feudalists' control was
bolstered by Lebanon's economy. As long as the economy thrived,
the feudalists could ignore calls for reform, much less
revolution.
By the 1970s, however, more and more Lebanese had begun to
find themselves in strained circumstances. The have/have-not gap
had grown, with the Christian and Sunni communities doing well to
quite well, and the rest--particularly the Shias--doing not well
at all.
At this point the head of the Druze community, Kamal
Jumblat, took charge of the anti-establishment agitation.
Jumblat, a strange figure (by Middle East lights), was something
of a mystic and a genuine reformer; however, he was also a
13
traditional Lebanese warlord. He commanded the Druze, a
community renowned for its fighting prowess. As things then stood
in Lebanon, the Druze were probably the only sect that could
stand up to the Christians militarily. With the Druze leading the
newly formed leftist coalition (called, by Jumblat, the National
Movement), the Christians found themselves facing a serious
challenge.
The aim of Jumblat and the leftists was to destroy the
confessional basis on which Lebanese politics was run,
substituting for it a form of proportional representation, and
also to bring the country into the orbit of the Soviet Union.
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This last objective may seem surprising, but in fact it made
sense. Since the Christians boasted of their strong ties to the
West, it was natural that the enemies of the Christians should
seek to ally themselves with the Soviet Union.
The move to bring Lebanon into the camp of the Soviets was
something that the leftists originated without, it appears, any
encouragement from Moscow. Indeed, it could be argued that the
Russians wanted no part of this since--were the move to have
succeeded--it would have disrupted the regional power balance and
might have provoked a superpower confrontation. (This is an
important point which we will develop more fully later.)
Under normal conditions, a power realignment of this scope
would probably not have been likely. However, with the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon, it became a possibility. The
Palestinians in many ways were natural allies of the National
Movement forces. Like the latter, they looked to Moscow for
support, and, also like them, they saw themselves as underdogs, a
people who had been victimized by the system. Starting in the
mid-1970s, Jumblat maneuvered to bring the Palestinian/leftist
alliance into being.
The Palestinian Factor.
In 1975, fighting broke out between the Palestinians and the
Christians. It started in Beirut and, in a matter of days, spread
throughout Lebanon, drawing in the National Movement forces. With
14
that the civil war was on.
Originally Syria opposed the war, for much the same reasons
that had influenced the Soviets. It foresaw that this could
escalate, drawing in the superpowers. Assad argued that neither
Israel nor the United States would stand for a "red republic of
Lebanon." Once it appeared that such an entity might come into
being, Israel (if not the United States) would certainly oppose
it.
Nonetheless, within a comparatively short time it did appear
that this would happen. The National Movement forces, backed by
the Palestinians, pushed the Christians into a trap, surrounding
15
the Phalange militia of the Maronites in the town of Zahle. (See
Figure 2.) The Christians held out, thanks in part to the
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Israelis, who had for some time been supplying them by sea.
Meanwhile Assad summoned one leftist leader after another to
16
Damascus to insist that the seige be lifted. He remonstrated
that Israel could not be restrained, and indeed the Israelis had
begun to threaten intervention on the Christian side. Assad
wanted this "foolishness" stopped. However, Jumblat was adamant
that the Christians must be curbed for good and all.
At this point, the Christian President of Lebanon Suleiman
Franjiyah appealed to the Arab League for succor, and the League
17
responded positively. Assad's contribution to a League-sponsored
operation was to send 30,000 Syrian troops to force the leftists
to lift the seige of Zahle.

9
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Several well-respected and well-informed authors--most
notably Patrick Seale--maintain that the United States was
involved in this decision; that then Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger not only approved Syria's action but induced the
18
Israelis not to oppose it.
Israeli backing for a Syrian thrust into Lebanon would not
appear, on the face of it, to be credible. Tel Aviv and Damascus
both competed for influence over Lebanon, each claiming it as its
sphere of interest. A Syrian invasion, under such circumstances,
would not enhance Israel's power position. As it turned out,
however, the intervention suited the Israelis very well; it
divided the Arab Rejectionist Front. The Front was a coalition of
19
Arab forces actively carrying on the fight against Israel.
Syria, by challenging the National Movement, split this grouping-from Israel's standpoint a highly desirable development.
Syria took considerable abuse from the other Arab states for
its action. Initially, to be sure, the Arab League had supported
the Syrian intervention, assuming that the mere appearance of the
Syrian army in Lebanon would cause the leftists to stand down.
When this did not happen, and when the leftists commenced to
fight the Syrians, Assad ordered his military to crush their
resistance. At one point the Syrian army stood by and let the
resuscitated Christian forces massacre some 3,000 Palestinians in
20
their camps.
The Arab League further was upset because--after the leftist
challenge had been beaten--the Syrians stayed on in Lebanon; they
did not withdraw. To be sure, a large expedition like this could
not be shut off just like that. The Syrians could not relieve the
beleaguered Christians, and then immediately turn around and
depart the country; they had to guard against a flareup of the
fighting. Still, months after the seige had been lifted, the
Syrians were still there, and, not only the Arab League members
were upset, but the Israelis as well.
As part of the deal that Kissinger originally had brokered,
Syria accepted Israeli-imposed limitations on its activities
21
inside Lebanon. For one thing Syrian forces south of the BeirutDamascus road could not exceed one brigade (see Figure 2), and,
furthermore, Syria was prevented from setting up missile
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batteries inside the country. This arrangement, called the Red
Line Agreement, kept the peace initially, but then broke down.
The Christians Grow Impatient.
As time passed, the Christians grew impatient over Syria's
continued Lebanon stay. The Maronite militiamen of the Phalange
pleaded with Israel's then prime minister Itzhak Rabin to help
them oust the Syrians (and the Palestinians). Rabin temporized,
unwilling to become involved militarily. At the same time, he did
extend various forms of aid to the Phalange. He enhanced its
military strength by supplying it with arms, and also undertook
22
to have Phalange youth receive military training from the IDF.
Then, in 1977 the Israelis did an about face and commenced
planning for an intervention. This was the year that Menahim
Begin, the head of Israel's Likud Party, took over as Israel's
prime minister. Likud, unlike Israel's Labor Party, was
expansionist. Its leaders dreamed of extending Israel's borders,
23
ostensibly to make the country more secure. To be sure, after
1973 those borders had been shrinking, since Israel's setback in
the fourth Arab-Israeli war. As part of a peace settlement with
Egypt, Israel had agreed to surrender the Sinai Peninsula. In
return, however, it compelled Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to
sign a separate peace. As a result of this action, relations
between Egypt and Syria--partners in the 1973 war--became
strained. The Syrians felt themselves bereft, because without
Egypt they could not hope to stand up to Israel militarily; the
balance of power in the Middle East had swung back to Israel,
whose power position was now virtually unassailable.
After this, Assad had to rethink his options. Thus when the
Palestinians and Lebanese leftists began to battle the Christians
again, he backed them. This vascilation may seem odd, but in the
Middle East it is commonplace. Ideology is not as strong a factor
as some make it out to be. In fact, a point we will make in the
study is that Assad consistently has respected the balance of
power, and sought where possible to maintain it. Where he has
moved militarily, it has generally been for reasons of state.
Not so in the case of Israel under Likud. In 1978 and again
in 1982 Menahim Begin actively sought to disrupt the power
balance by invading neighboring Lebanon. Indeed one could argue
that having failed to impose his authority over Lebanon in the
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first attempt, Begin deliberately created the conditions for a
second invasion in 1982.
In its first, 1978, incursion into Lebanon, Israel committed
30,000 troops and displaced more than 200,000 Lebanese who fled
in a mass exodus to Beirut. It also seized territory as far north
as the Litani River (see Figure 2). Although Begin claimed to be
acting with cause, Washington opposed the invasion, and, as a
consequence, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance--at the behest of
24
then President Jimmy Carter--pressured Tel Aviv to pull back.
Afterward Carter supported emplacement of United Nations forces
in the south. Nonetheless, Israel did not completely pull out of
the country, but kept troops in a narrow strip along the border,
thus creating its own security zone.
This zone reflected Begin's policy; the Israeli prime
minister never gave up an asset. He had invaded Lebanon, and was
bound to have something to show for it. Thus, despite the
displeasure of the United States, Begin kept the extreme southern
portion of the country. This action, however, ultimately proved
Israel's undoing, because it alienated the Lebanese Shia
community.
Until this point the Shias had kept out of the National
Movement, even though one would have expected them to join since
they were arguably the most oppressed community in Lebanon. At
the same time, however, (as pointed out above) they were hostile
towards the Palestinians, whom they could not forgive for turning
their homeland into a battleground by making it a staging area
for raids on Israel. The Shias would have nothing to do with a
coalition of which the Palestinians were a part.
Nonetheless, after the Israelis invaded in 1978 things began
to change, and it was activities of the IDF that soured the Shias
on the Israelis. The IDF began cooperating with local Christian
25
communities in the south, effectively by-passing the Shias.
Since the latter were by far the most numerous group in the area,
this slight was resented. The Shias believed that Israel would
turn over control of their area to their Christian rivals. Having
just seen the Palestinians driven off, they were dismayed by this
new development. Subsequently, several important Israeli
politicians have looked back on Israel's treatment of the Shias
26
and pronounced it a major error. At the time, however, the
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backward, desperately poor Shia population was not seen as a
threat to the Jewish state, or even a factor worth considering.
So, despite the community's protests, the Shias were ignored.
That the Shias potentially were harmful to Israeli interests
ought to have been apparent. The community had undergone a
profound change (since the 1970s). Elements of it had begun
mobilizing militarily and had created a militia. To be sure the
appearance of militia was not unusual, not in Lebanon in those
days when every sect had its own fighting force. The Shias,
however, had for years refrained from forming such a group. That
they had now done so ought to have alerted the Israelis to
trouble ahead, since the community's outstanding grievance was
the loss of their southern territory to the IDF.
The newly formed militia of the Shias was called Amal, an
acronym for Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya (Lebanese Resistence
Detachments), and it was not long before it was locked in combat
with both the IDF and a newly created Israeli surrogate force,
the South Lebanon Army (SLA). This unit, comprising mainly
Christians, was the Israelis' gendarme in the southern region,
which Tel Aviv now had taken to calling its "security zone."
Thus, it appeared to the Shias that the Israelis were moving to
permanently annex their homeland, and this is what triggered the
hostilities between the two forces. Once Amal and the Israelis
clashed there was then nothing to prevent the Shias from joining
the Lebanese leftists, which increased the strength of the latter
significantly. Still, the Israelis do not seem to have recognized
the danger of the situation that they were getting into.
The Onslaught of Terror.
Just as many Israeli leaders failed to perceive the dangers
evolving in Lebanon, so, too, were the Christians blinded. They
continued their agitation for Israel to invade, and, when the
latter procrastinated, the Christians, in effect, forced the
issue. In 1981, the Phalange leader, Bashir Gemayl, apparently
thought himself strong enough to challenge Assad. He ordered the
construction of a highway across the mountains from the
Maronites' stronghold outside of Beirut to Zahle in the Beka'a
27
Valley (See Figure 2). This road, had it been completed, would
have enabled Bashir to dominate the Beirut-Damascus road, the
main corridor through which Syrian troops must pass to enter
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Lebanon. Hence, Bashir's road-construction activity was a
flagrant provocation. With this in mind, on April 25, 1981, Assad
sent helicopter gunships loaded with troops to clear the
Phalangists off the ridge line where the road was being built. On
April 28 he repeated this operation, and the Israelis shot the
28
helicopters down. The Israelis maintained that--under the Red
Line Agreement--Syria was not allowed to provide air cover for
its troops. Syria counter-argued that the helicopters were
ferrying, not providing air cover for the units. An angry Assad
reacted by bringing missile batteries inside Lebanon, which, of
course, was a clear violation of the Kissinger- brokered deal.
Not long after this, the Israelis, in response to a
terrorist incident, sent their forces back into Lebanon, and this
29
time they went all the way to Beirut. They did not, however,
enter the Lebanese capital, because, were they to have done so,
they would then have had to confront the leftists and Syrians in
the narrow streets of the city. This almost certainly would have
meant large numbers of casualties, which the Israelis were not
prepared to accept. That Israel could not complete its invasion
of Lebanon by conquering Beirut was unfortunate for its
interests. Effectively, it stalemated the whole invasion
operation, and eventually the United States was brought to
intervene with American troops. The Israeli forces then withdrew.
President Ronald Reagan brokered a "solution" whereby the
Palestinians agreed to leave Lebanon once and for all. Lebanon's
Parliament, which recently had elected Bashir Gemayl president,
then signed an accord with Israel that amounted to a separate
peace. It appeared that the Israelis had won the day, an
extraordinary sequel to their success at Camp David. Syria looked
to have lost in its closely contested struggle with the Jewish
state.
However, in rapid succession a series of events occurred
that were completely to reverse the situation. There were several
vicious bombings, in which not only Israelis but Americans were
targeted. The greatest loss of life was at the U.S. Marine Corps
barracks in Beirut where 241 U.S. servicemen died. In another
explosion 67 Israeli troops perished in the city of Tyre. As a
consequence of this latter bombing a great hue arose in Israel to
bring the IDF home. Israelis were increasingly unhappy over
"Begin's war," as they called it. The casualties were too high.
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Along with that, Israel's reputation was tarnished by the affair.
Images of the IDF using phosphorous and cluster bombs against
Lebanon's civilian population took their toll on the nightly
television news.
Then Bashir himself was blown up, and the leftist coalition
launched a full-scale assault on the Christian-dominated Lebanese
army. With that Amin Gemayl, Bashir's brother--who had taken over
the presidency--went to Damascus where he tore up the accord so
recently signed with Begin. In the short space of a few weeks the
situation was completely reversed. Now it appeared that Assad,
not Begin, was the winner. How did this happen?
The Force of the Shias.
The group that carried out the terrible bombings was a
relative newcomer to the Lebanese area, Hizbollah (the Party of
God). Hizbollah was drawn from the Shia community; it was not,
however, an arm of Amal. This was a totally new organization, one
that had been formed by the Iranians.
In 1982, a band of Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrived in
Lebanon from Tehran. They undertook to mobilize the Shia
community. They provided arms training and weapons, and
additionally they delivered extensive social services.
Eventually, the Iranians took the cadres that they had trained
and formed them into a new organization, Hizbollah.
The Iranians had just engineered a successful religious
revolt at home, the first genuine revolution in the Middle East
since the Algerian insurrection in 1962. As a part of this
revolution, elements of the Iranian community committed
themselves to undertake a worldwide jihad in behalf of Islam.
This revolution motivated the Iranians to invade Iraq in 1982,
and it was also behind their decision to intervene in Lebanon.
At the time, Iran's intrusion into Lebanon was viewed as an
extraordinary event. What motivated the Iranians to do so puzzled
many. Even today, opinion widely differs over this. If one puts
to one side Iran's motives however, and concentrates only on
results, the move was significant. For one thing, it unleashed
terrible forces previously pent up within the Lebanese Shia
community, among them a penchant for martyrdom, which has always
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been a feature of Shia Islam, the sect of which the Iranians,
like the Hizbollahis, are a part.
The insidious nature of the martyrdom tactic is that it is
practically unbeatable. In all of the worst bombings, the victims
were helpless to defend themselves. Shias simply forced
themselves into areas where American or Israelis were massed, and
then detonated bombs, either strapped to their persons, or loaded
30
on trucks which the suicide bombers drove.
Faced with an enemy that would resort to such abhorrent
tactics, the Americans and then the Israelis retreated. The
Israelis moved first, pulling the IDF back to their security zone
in the south. Soon afterward, the Americans departed; U.S.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger withdrew them entirely
from the theater.
One could say, then, that what had turned the tide in
Lebanon was terror. At least it seemed that way from Assad's
perspective. He drew three fateful lessons from what had
occurred.
The Lessons Learned.
The first lesson that Assad absorbed involved the Israelis.
He saw that they were reluctant to take casualties. This was
revealed when they refused to go into West Beirut. Rather than
fight the leftists house-to-house in the back streets and alley
ways of that sprawling metropolis, Israel stood off and, in
effect, called on the United States to broker a solution. It
repeated this pattern of retreat after the bombing of IDF
headquarters in Tyre. Over a period of years the IDF surrendered
practically all of its conquests in Lebanon, except for the
narrow security zone.
The Israelis' performance convinced Assad that their muchvaunted military might was limited. The IDF depended on its
technological edge; once that edge was lost it became vulnerable.
To be sure, the Israelis are prepared to sacrifice in an imposed
war, such as in 1973, but "Begin's war" was not perceived in this
light. To much of the Israeli public, the invasion was an
undisguised power grab, of which they wanted no part. When the
casualties began to mount, the public demanded a withdrawal.
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Assad's second lesson involved the United States. Washington
suffered losses similar to that of Israel, and it, too, pulled
out. Lebanon was not of vital interest and so Washington was
indisposed to sacrifice in its behalf. This revelation shocked
the Christians (indeed all the Lebanese), who had assumed the
opposite to be true. The Lebanese had always assumed their
country was a bastion of the West. Indeed, in 1958, the United
States had sent Marines to defend Lebanon from communist
takeover, and after that the people of Lebanon had prided
31
themselves on being special allies of Washington.
When Washington pulled up stakes and withdrew over the
horizon, the rightists in the country were appalled. The
implications of the move were quite sobering. In fact, it meant
that Lebanon ceased to be an autonomous country. As pointed out
earlier, Lebanon had no adequate military of its own. The central
government had no means of imposing its will throughout the
country. The only effective instrument for keeping order
therefore was the Syrian army. Assad had not withdrawn his
forces, which were settled down throughout the country; indeed,
the Syrians were treating Lebanon as if it were a province of
theirs. This was a situation that affronted many Lebanese,
particularly the Christians, but were the Syrians to leave--what
then? Would not the land be torn with anarchy?
The final lesson was in many ways the most disturbing. The
appearance of Hizbollah upset all of the familiar understandings
that previously had prevailed in this part of the world. For one
thing, it had always been the case that dissidents survived by
allying themselves with powerful patrons. Hizbollah did not do
that. To be sure, it was allied to Iran, and secondarily to
Syria. But Iran, in the 1980s, was not viewed as particularly
powerful, and, this being the case, one had to wonder, why were
the Hizbollahis willing to make common cause with it?
Assad seems to have appreciated the appeal of Iran, and its
revolution, for the founding members of the Hizbollah movement.
Clearly, the attraction was ideological--Khomeini's message spoke
to the fervent young Muslims. Later in the study we will discuss
this more. Here it is sufficient to note that for Assad, the
Hizbollahis were potentially useful. Their violent ways in
particular appealed to him.
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Here was a group which--if its ideologues were to be
believed--was ready for anything. Motivated by deep contempt for
the world as it existed, the Hizbollahis were set to sweep away
32
the whole edifice of power. To them, existing power arrangements
and the blocs that supported them were anathema, fit only to be
destroyed. In this respect, the radicals seemed uncontrollable.
Left to themselves, there seemed no limit to the destruction that
they would wreak.
Assad looked at the Hizbollahis in contrast to the Israelis.
The latter were great conservers of life--at least the lives of
their own soldiers. The IDF was certainly not profligate in this
regard; if it could, it would conserve the life of every single
Israeli soldier. The Hizbollahis, on the other hand, craved
martyrdom, and would willingly sacrifice themselves, if only to
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confound their enemies.
To Assad, this must have seemed a perfect setup. Pit the
Hizbollahis against the IDF. The guerrillas, by their willingness
to employ suicidal tactics, might prove a match for the IDF,
which preferred to stand off and bombard the enemy with aircraft
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and long-range artillery. Given the IDF's technological
superiority, this type of warfare was ideal for it. At the same
time, however, in war it is impossible to avoid small unit
actions, and here the Hizbollahis came into their own.
As long as Israel held south Lebanon, the IDF was compelled
to patrol the area, the terrain of which favors guerrilla
operations. Cut with arroyo-like formations, southern Lebanon
affords excellent cover for ambush parties. They can lay
concealed in trenches no more than a few feet deep, and then,
leaping out, fire at passing patrols.
To be sure, such operations took their toll on the
guerrillas, armed as they were with rocket propelled grenades
(RPG), the range of which is only 150 meters. They had to attack
at close quarters which meant they rarely could escape, and
Israeli helicopter gunships would hunt them down. Despite initial
high losses, however, the Shias continued to press home their
assault, displaying considerable courage.
Starting about 1989, we witness Assad turning increasingly
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to the Hizbollahis, having apparently determined that they were
the perfect foil to use against the IDF.
The Changed Situation in Lebanon.
After the explosion at the U.S. Marine Corps barracks and
America's pullout, the situation in Lebanon fundamentally
changed. The Christians practically laid down their arms. As
stated above, the American departure disillusioned them. It was
not merely that they had lost a potential military ally;
something much more disturbing had occurred.
Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, Lebanon was the
banking center of the Middle East. As the war escalated,
depositors transferred their wealth out of the country. The most
serious defection was that of the Gulf monarchs, who now sought
the security of the financial centers of New York and London.
Without the monarchs' financial contributions the Lebanese
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banking system could not survive.
If Lebanon were to regain its erstwhile status (as the
Middle East's banker), it had to coax back that Gulf money. Had
America maintained its support of Lebanon, this probably could
have been accomplished. But, with the Americans gone, virtually
no hope existed of recouping Beirut's preeminent position. As a
consequence, the Christians, who had been foremost in directing
the country's finances, now began to emigrate, the pattern of
Lebanese life for centuries. In despair of making their fortunes
at home, the Christians sought new lives for themselves overseas.
Of course, the Palestinians, too, had departed--the one
great plus for the Israelis. The fedayeen fighters had been
forced to leave by the deal brokered between them and the Reagan
administration. Some Palestinians remained, to be sure, the far
leftist groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP). However, these became virtual puppets of the
Syrians. Indeed, all of the diehard Palestinian fighters who
remained behind in Lebanon were compelled by the Syrians to
relocate their headquarters to Damascus, where they came directly
36
under Assad's control.
The Lebanese government, too, became a victim of Assad's
takeover since it no longer controlled much of anything.
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Practically every important action it took had to be cleared with
Assad; in that respect Lebanon's president became a kind of
factotum running between Beirut and Damascus. This almost total
subservience of the Lebanese to the Syrians was to have great
significance once the peace talks between the Israelis and Arabs
commenced in 1990. It meant, in effect, that Assad controlled the
Lebanese delegation, which could take no independent position,
but had to constantly defer to the Syrian president.
At this stage (in 1989), Assad probably did not foresee the
opportunities that were open to him. If he congratulated himself
at all, it was probably on having faced down the Israelis. The
fact that he could actually capitalize on his victory, to
aggrandize himself even further, almost certainly was not
apparent at this stage. The realization of how well off he was
did not come until the next year.
The Standoff.
In 1989, Syria and Israel confronted each other in Lebanon
like a couple of schoolboys standing inside a circle, each
demanding that the other quit the circle, or face being ejected.
Neither would make the first move, and so the confrontation
simply dragged on.
Israel was adamant that it would not withdraw from the south
of Lebanon until Syrian forces had pulled out of the north. Assad
maintained that, inasmuch as his forces originally had been
invited into Lebanon by the Lebanese government, they were there
by right. It was Israel that had invaded the country, and
therefore it must be the first to depart.
There is no telling how long this situation might have
continued, with Lebanon effectively partitioned into separate
spheres of interest, one Israeli-controlled, the other under the
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domination of Damascus. In 1990, however, the United States
announced that it intended to open peace talks between the
Israelis and their Arab neighbors, and this proved the catalyst
to move towards a resolution of the impasse.
Assad knew, going into the peace talks, that his position
was weak. His army was so far inferior to that of Israel that he
could not hope to take on the latter militarily. Further, he
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lacked friends in the international arena, after the Soviet Union
had fallen. He therefore had no way of pressuring his enemies to
bargain with him in earnest.
At the outset of the talks, Israel adopted the stance that
it had no need to achieve a peace with its Arab neighbors. It
38
held all the territory that it wanted. With these holdings it
felt secure. Why should it bargain with the Arabs? It had peace-or, if it did not, it had security, the next best thing. Israel
therefore determined that it would make no concessions. If there
were to be concessions, they must come from the Arab side.
As events have subsequently shown, this was in practically
all cases a solid strategy. It certainly has paid off with
respect to the Palestinians. Yasir Arafat, leader of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), has had to make
significant concessions to the Israelis just to get them to sit
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down with him. Jordan's King Hussein has effectively made peace
with Israel, on the latter's terms. Only Syria is continuing to
hold out, and here, it would appear, Israel's strategy has broken
down.
Playing the Lebanon Card.
Prior to the start of the peace talks, Assad had been
assisting the Hizbollahis to carry on a low-level guerrilla war
in the south of Lebanon, in cooperation with Iran. The latter
resupplied its clients with arms and provisions, flown to
Damascus in regularly scheduled runs and off loaded to the
Hizbollahis, who then transhipped them south through the Beka'a
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Valley.
The war in the south never developed into much, because the
Hizbollahis for a considerable time lacked the expertise to
accomplish anything. Although brave certainly, their courage,
against a superior force like the IDF, did not go very far. For a
long time the Hizbollahis did not constitute anything more than a
minor irritant to the IDF.
Starting in early 1993, however, the picture began to
change. The operations of the Hizbollahis increased in intensity
41
as the guerrillas displayed more and more proficiency. Along
with that, they had been supplied with some extremely
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sophisticated weapons, like the Russian-made AT-3 (Sagger) wire
guided missile, with a range of between 500 and 3000 meters. With
these, they overcame the handicap they had suffered previously;
when armed only with RPGs, they had been forced to initiate
actions under almost suicidal conditions.
As the war in the south escalated, the Israelis suffered two
concerns. First, their surrogate force, the SLA, was losing
heart; there had been significant defections to the side of
Hizbollah. Indeed, in one incident a whole SLA unit went over to
the Hizbollahis, and afterward several of the defectors appeared
on Beirut television to explain why they had abandoned the
42
Israeli cause. Along with that, IDF soldiers were being lost in
unacceptable numbers.
Therefore, in spring 1993, the Rabin government decided to
check the rapidly deteriorating situation. It determined to
attack Lebanon. However, this would not be a ground invasion, in
the manner of past such attacks. The IDF would rather bombard the
south and target it with air strikes, the idea being to create
43
chaos in the southern region, thus to bring the Beirut
government to the point of collapse. To spare their client, the
Syrians would then have to agree to call off Hizbollah.
The Israelis named this exercise Operation Accountability,
because to them it was Assad who should be held accountable for
the guerrillas. In this latest flareup of guerrilla violence he
was particularly suspect because of certain events that had
occurred outside Lebanon in connection with the peace conference.
Coping with Breakdown in the Talks.
In spring 1993, the U.S.-sponsored talks had practically
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broken down. In the Arabs' eyes, the Israelis were stonewalling.
Indeed, the Arabs despaired of going on with the talks; the
Israelis were so unyielding. It was either walk out, the Arabs
45
felt, or give in to Tel Aviv's demands.
Rather than walk away from the talks, Assad apparently
determined to show Israel there was a price for behaving in this
fashion. By stepping up the guerrilla war--and killing a
significant number of IDF soldiers--Assad was, in effect,
offering a quid pro quo. Israel could expect to suffer more such
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costly guerrilla actions, unless it agreed to be more forthcoming
towards the Arab side.
This being the case, Rabin decided to respond in kind. By
by-passing the guerrillas and seeking to destabilize the Lebanese
government, he was saying to Assad--we hold you responsible for
this situation, and you must correct it or we will create such
pandemonium in Lebanon that the country you claim as your client
46
will fall apart.
The shelling of southern Lebanon continued for a week, and
did in fact cause considerable suffering among the Shias.
However, when the shelling stopped, and the few IDF infantry
units that had been deployed inside Lebanon were withdrawn, the
Hizbollahis returned to the south, and within a matter of weeks
had resumed their operations. Indeed, in August 1993 the
guerrillas ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing nine IDF soldiers,
47
the largest loss of Israelis in a single engagement since 1982.
After this Rabin did nothing. Indeed he accepted the fact
that Syria could keep up the war in the south while the peace
48
talks went on. This was a most unexpected development. One would
have thought that Israel would have withdrawn from the talks
immediately. If, as the Israelis had been maintaining, they did
not need a formal peace with their neighbors, why then were they
going on with the negotiations? Indeed, Israel not only did not
pull out of the talks, it tried to pressure Damascus-- through
the United States--to come to an agreement. Secretary of State
Christopher's repeated shuttles between Damascus and Tel Aviv and
the subsequent meetings between President Clinton and Assad were
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all at the behest of the Israelis, to try to break the deadlock.
In other words, it now appeared that the situation had
reversed itself. Assad was holding out in the talks while the
Israelis had become the petitioners. How had this developed?
Involving the Gulf States.
Only recently has it become apparent how much Israel needs
peace, for the reason that only with peace can Israel's economic
situation be improved. This became clear with the convening of
50
the Casablanca Conference in Morocco in November. Israel sent a
huge delegation to this conference, which lobbied for the
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creation of a regional bank. This bank--the money for which would
largely be subscribed by the Gulf states--would fund projects to
51
develop the whole Middle East region, Israel included.
Although the United States supported Israel's push for the
creation of such an agency, the plan foundered (for the time
being, at least) on the reluctance of the Gulf states to commit
the necessary funds. The monarchs pleaded that the time was not
52
ripe, since there was still war in the region.
The only war in the area is the one between the Hizbollahis
and the IDF in southern Lebanon (that and the escalating conflict
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carried on by Hamas inside the occupied territories). Since
backing from Assad allows that fight to continue, he, therefore,
is the key to ending the conflict. There can be no real peace in
the area (that is, one in which the Arabs accept Israel's de jure
existence), without the Syrian president's cooperation. If Assad
gets a settlement on the Golan, it seems certain Israel will get
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one in Lebanon, after which things will return to calm.
Effectively, then, Assad has succeeded in equalizing the
contest between himself and the Israelis at the negotiating
table. He has something that Israel wants--an end to the fighting
which would then open the area to development by the regional
bank. The banking scheme to be sure is visionary, but it could be
realized if the Gulf monarchs' concerns were addressed. This
being the case, the Israelis are motivated to make concessions to
Assad, to get on to the phase of economic development.
As with all complex situations, however, it rarely happens
that there is a neat solution. Just so in this instance. There is
an outstanding objection to making peace on Assad's terms.
Skeptics within the Israeli establishment claim that Assad is so
insecure at home, he could not deliver on a peace deal, were one
to be made with him.
The Question of Syrian Stability.
Syria is not a rich country, nor has it ever been, at least
in modern times. While it has oil, it is heavy oil which is not
in demand for export. Syria can, however, provide for its own
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fuel needs.
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The major drawback to Syria's development is the country's
economic system. Patterned after that of communist Eastern
European governments, Syria's system is among the most controlled
in the Middle East, if not the world. Every aspect of the economy
is subject to government oversight (except for agriculture). The
public sector is heavily bureaucratized, and looks into every
56
detail of the economy's operation.
Politically, too, the society is overcontrolled. Assad sits
at the tip of a great pyramid of power. He is reputed to make
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decisions governing the most minute details. He oversees all
important appointments; no one achieves high position in Syria
who has not first been vetted by Assad.
In this respect, Syria is a great deal like its sister
Ba'thist republic, Iraq, but whereas Iraq is a highly controlled
society where (until recently, at least) things were efficiently
managed, Syria is inefficiently run, and the reason is
corruption. Syria has the unenviable distinction of having
probably the most corrupt government in the Middle East, as
judged by Middle Easterners. The people of Syria are aware of
this, and reportedly are unhappy with the situation, but
recognize that they are powerless to rectify it.
Corruption is traceable, in part, to the French, who, as
already discussed, held the mandate for Syria after World War I.
They were responsible for developing the country's governing
arrangements. Specifically, they installed an Alawi elite in
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power. Alawis are an obscure Middle Eastern sect which orthodox
Sunnis regard as heretical. The French made the Alawais the
rulers of Syria, a position they have maintained ever since by
means that are quite ruthless.
This makes for a bad situation. The overwhelming majority of
the country's population, being Sunni, distrusts--and has
contempt for--the country's rulers. To offset this scarcely
repressed hostility, the leadership maintains an extraordinary
solidarity. Assad, of course, is Alawi, as are all of his
division commanders, his chiefs of security, and top air force
officers. By looking out for each other, the sect members have
withstood numerous challenges (but not always effortlessly, as we
shall see below).
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Corruption has also affected Syria's involvement in Lebanon,
59
where the Syrians are known to be trafficking in drugs. Indeed,
the area where the drugs are grown is under their control, as is
the port from which the drugs are shipped out of the country.
Meanwhile, in all stages of the drugs' movement inside Lebanon,
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Syrian commanders take their cut. This corruption is so
widespread it has affected the military's performance. The Syrian
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army is not well-regarded. It is badly disciplined, ill trained,
and not up to the standard of the Israelis. Practically speaking,
the Syrian army's major task is to guard the regime. Of the
several divisions in the army, half are quartered close to the
capital. In the capital, the command is divided, with one top
commander reporting to the army staff, the other directly to
Assad. Until Assad's brother, Rifaat, overstepped himself in
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1983, there was even a third layer of protection. Rifaat
commanded the so-called Defense Companies, whose only mission was
to protect the president.
Interestingly, Assad seems to stand above and outside of all
this corrupt dealing. The Syrian people appear to tolerate him.
His personal lifestyle is seemingly impeccable. He lives a life
secluded from public view. His wife is modest and self-effacing.
His children are well-behaved and mannerly, in public at least.
The great tragedy of Assad's life was the recent death of
his son, Basil, in a car accident. Assad had been grooming Basil
to succeed him. This had not been an easy task. The average
Syrian was unwilling to see the office of president manipulated
in this way. Syria's military leaders were not much taken with
the idea either. Hence, Assad invested considerable capital in
positioning Basil to inherit the rulership. Principally, he
cultivated the Syrian power elite, promoting individuals who were
disposed toward Basil, and sidelining those who were not.
Until recently it was widely perceived that Assad had
succeeded in his mission. The public appeared ready to accept
Basil. They recognized his good qualities, which, in fact, were
numerous. He had gone through university as an engineer and
gotten his degree. He did well in the army, and had established a
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reputation as a reformer. None of the corruption that tarnished
other officers rubbed off on him.
And then he died in the car accident, leaving his father
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bereft. Now Assad is attempting to put forward his other son,
Bashir. But Bashir lacks the charisma of Basil. In fact, Bashir
had to be summoned home from London, where he was studying to
become an eye doctor, to begin his leadership training. He came
reluctantly, it was said, and now is not doing well as commander
of a tank unit where Assad has placed him.
The issue of succession is a pressing one as Assad is known
to be in ill health. In 1983, he apparently had a heart attack,
and this led to a crisis of sorts. While the president was
recuperating, the men around Assad fell to fighting among
themselves, and his brother, Rifaat, came close to leading a coup
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d'etat. Assad, however, recovered in time to calm the unrest,
and ultimately exiled Rifaat to Paris, where he has remained ever
since.
These problems--the difficult succession, the corrupt men
around Assad, the president's ill health--all would appear to
buttress the argument of those who oppose making a deal with the
Syrians. However there are counterarguments, one of which the
author finds compelling--there is no effective opposition in
Syria; Assad does not have to worry about subversive forces
conspiring against him. There was an opposition at one time, but
Assad crushed it, and the manner in which he did is quite
revealing.
Purging the Brotherhood.
Held down by the Alawis for years, Syria's majority Sunni
sect long ago adopted a stance of resignation. They departed from
this, however, in 1982 when elements of the community led a
fierce rebellion against Assad's government.
In 1982, Syria's situation was particularly dismal. Assad
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had just allied the country with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. This
alienated the Gulf monarchs, Syria's principal financial backers.
Then he took the country into Lebanon, to oppose the Israeli
invasion. One of these moves, by itself, would have strained
Syrian resources. The two taken together practically broke the
economy.
To be sure, the Sunni rebellion did not develop overnight;
it had been simmering for some time. Since at least the 1970s the
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Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful Sunni opposition group in
the Arab world, had been combatting Assad's government through
67
acts of sabotage.
In Syria, the bulk of the Brotherhood's membership comprised
middle class elements, as well as less well-off petit bourgeois.
The strongholds of the Brotherhood were located in the north of
Syria, in Hama and Homs. The discontent originated there, and by
1979 it had spread fairly widely. In June of that year an
extraordinary event occurred, the murder, gangland style, of some
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69 Alawi officer cadets at the Aleppo military school.
After that, the dissidence erupted into outright revolt.
Militants associated with the Brotherhood assassinated a number
of Syrian leaders; several Ba'thist headquarters were bombed, and
there were running gun battles between the Brothers and Syrian
security forces in the capital. This, for Assad and the other
regime leaders, was the final straw.
In February 1982, Assad's brother, Rifaat, marched north to
Hama with his Defense Companies and ringed the city, after which
he proceeded to bombard it for 3 weeks. Then the companies moved
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into Hama and went house-to-house rooting out resisters. The
conservative toll of dead was set at 20,000. The companies
wreaked similar destruction on Homs and Aleppo, which would
appear to indicate the actual toll was higher. After the purge,
the Brotherhood ceased to be active. Periodically, reports are
heard of a Brotherhood revival, but these never seem to develop
into anything; signs of overt dissatisfaction with the regime are
meager. For example, it is claimed that the fundamentalists are
gaining support, and the evidence cited is the increase in Muslim
dress by Syrian women. This is interesting certainly; but, by
itself, it does not appear to be significant.
It seems unlikely that a resurgence of opposition will
develop in Syria, when one looks at the record of recent events.
For example in 1993, the country experienced a disastrous summer
drought, with a virtual shutoff of water to all the major cities.
In the capital, water was out 8 hours a day for weeks. Without
water, restaurants shut down, laundries failed to operate, food
rotted in the stores--there was even a threat of cholera. Israeli
newspapers ridiculed the Syrians editorially, saying it was hard
to take seriously a regime that could not supply water to its
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capital.

In the end nothing came of this. In Algeria, a similar
episode (in 1979) produced the revolt of the Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS), which many now fear will topple Algeria's ruling
71
junta. What appears to be working in Assad's favor is the
relative prosperity of the country; the agriculture sector, in
particular, is doing well, and government officials have boasted
that as long as the country can feed itself (with a surplus for
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export), they have no fear for the security of Assad's regime.
Thus, the issue of whether Assad is threatened at home (and
whether, therefore, it is a good idea to negotiate with him) is
undecided; one can argue either way. If one wants to negotiate
with the Syrian president, a case can be made for this; if one
does not, a case likewise can be made.
Taking it all into to account, however, the author favors
making an agreement, mainly because of what is happening in
Lebanon with the Shias.
A Community on the Move.
The Shia community in Lebanon is a dynamic one. It has been
growing and developing politically since at least the 1970s.
Restless and assertive as it is, the community has the potential
to harm not only the interests of Israel but also those of the
United States.
At present Hizbollah is one of the leading forces in the
Shia community; unquestionably it is the dominant party in the
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south. However, the basis of this dominance seems to be little
understood, in the West at least. The Western media consistently
portray Hizbollah as a lot of fanatics, in the pay of Iran.
Certainly fanaticism is a large part of what Hizbollah is about,
and certainly Iran is financing the party's activities. But the
party's strength does not derive exclusively--or even primarily-from the ideological commitment of its followers or from their
willingness to take Iranian subventions.
Hizbollah serves the community. It sounds bizarre to state
it this boldly, but this is the essence of the relationship
between it and the mass of Shias. From 1982, when Iran's
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Revolutionary Guards first arrived in Lebanon, the radicals have
been consolidating their power base by dispensing services the
community needs. Essential services which are unavailable must be
gotten somewhere, if the community is to survive.
Once Israel declared the south a security zone, the area
practically lost contact with Beirut, i.e., the central
government. Hence, the government cannot provide for it. Indeed,
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the Lebanese army cannot even operate south of the Litani River.
This means that the southern Shias are on their own, in an
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environment where the SLA and IDF are constantly harassing them.
The Shias do not receive social services from the Israelis, no
protection, nothing. All this they get from Hizbollah.
In return for serving the community, the party demands
military service from its youth. This is a purely feudal
relationship, no different from that which prevailed in the days
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when the warlords were in power. It is a way of life that has
characterized Lebanese society for centuries. Moreover, it is an
efficient arrangement, well-understood by the Lebanese. What
makes the party powerful, then, is the patronage it has to
bestow. It would not be nearly so threatening if it depended on
ideology or even on pay-offs from the Iranians.
Further, it seems likely that the party will continue to
grow. Indeed, in recent national elections eight candidates put
forward by Hizbollah took their seats in the Parliament. This
must be taken as an indicator of the party's strength.
The message to the Israelis should be plain--something must
be done to check Hizbollah's power, or else deflect it away from
its present radicalism. It seems to the author that Syria is
offering a way of accomplishing this. Assad apparently is willing
to cut off the guerrillas' supply line through the Beka'a Valley,
in effect shutting down their operations. In return, he wants
Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights. After that, Syria will
pull its troops out of northern Lebanon, if the Israelis abandon
their security zone. This will enable the Lebanese army to take
over the south, at which point, presumably, the Shias will get
back their land and the fighting will cease. The Shias have been
struggling for over a decade to repossess this territory and once
77
they have it they should have no need to go on fighting.
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But opposing this deal are some Israeli politicians (mainly
from Likud) who are saying that Hizbollah is anti-West, and antiIsrael, and that, therefore, there should be no thought of making
a deal with it. This is probably true, but it is largely
irrelevant. The important thing is not that the party be friendly
towards the West, but that it not actively fight against Western
interests.
The Israeli politicians opposed to making peace with Assad
should be challenged to say how they intend to resolve this
difficulty. In this regard it is interesting to reemphasize that
many Israeli hawks are members of the Likud Party. That party's
record in the past has not been reassuring. Likud invaded
Lebanon, twice. Its "solution" to the Palestinian problem was to
drive the Palestinians out of Israel into Jordan, and let King
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Hussein take care of them. In a word, Likud's answer to most
challenges facing Israel is force.
Force does not come cheaply; using it is a costly
proposition, and Israel is not a wealthy country. It seems
unlikely that Washington will help Israel pacify Lebanon. Indeed,
it would be ironic if the United States, after developing the
Weinberger Doctrine to prevent such involvements, would then
thrust itself back into the very arena where the doctrine was
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born.
Thus, if Likud is thinking of reinvading Lebanon, it might
want to pause and consider. It should examine its perceptions
about the Hizbollahis, particularly from whence they derive their
power. It is incorrect to assume (as many Israelis seem to do)
that the party is the tool of the Syrians--or even of the
Iranians. The party draws strength from the Shia community, which
has been aggressively on the move for years now. Since at least
the 1970s, the Shias have been pushing forward, determined to
make a place from themselves in Lebanese society. To hold back
such a community is no easy task. It certainly cannot be done
without enormous expenditure of resources, which at present are
in extremely short supply.
What Assad Wants.
There are those in Israel (and in the West as well) who
maintain that Assad is the one who is holding up the peace
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process. The claim is made that Israel will make peace in a
minute, but Assad's demand to have the Golan restored him in a
year is unrealistic.
It is hard not to credit Assad's compunctions. He has no
reason to believe, were he to agree to a staged return, that this
would ever be completed. Likud Party leaders in Israel have said
that they will not be bound by any deal that Rabin enters into
with Assad. Were they to be returned to power (they have said),
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they might reject it. Under such circumstances, Assad must focus
on achieving concrete gains which cannot subsequently be
overturned. Getting the Golan back, with the chance to repopulate
it, would be a notable achievement, and not something that the
Likud politicians could later on repudiate.
What about Israel's claim that the Heights are strategic,
and that to abandon them would be to expose itself to attack? In
times past the Golan was an ideal observation post; it was also-for the Syrians--a good staging ground for a surprise attack. But
no one seriously believes that the Syrian army could, by itself,
stage an attack on Israel, not under today's conditions. It would
be suicide, given the discrepancy in the nations' strengths.
Also, Israel has the most sophisticated monitoring equipment
available and does not need the Heights for this any longer. In
effect, then, the claim that the Heights are strategic can no
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longer be sustained.
The Prospect for the Future.
For the Syrians--and indeed for the entire Middle East-there are signs of a great revival. After the long, draining
experience of war, an opportunity exists for all the area states
to move forward. Syria, in particular, is well placed to advance.
Assad shrewdly threw his support behind the Allied coalition
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during the Gulf War. This won him the gratitude of the Kuwaitis
and Saudis. Both these immensely rich regimes are willing now to
assist in developing Syria's economy. This is significant, given
the situation discussed above--the animus of the Syrian Sunni
community against Assad. The Muslim Brothers, the major
opposition group in Syria, receives its backing mainly from the
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Gulf. Were the Saudis to call upon the Brothers to support the
Syrian president--and promise, in return, to finance Syrian
development--it is likely the Brothers would go along. Certainly,
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the Saudis would strive to gain such backing; it is clear that
they want to see the Arab-Jewish conflict ended. At the same
time, the Saudis are influential in Lebanon, where a similar push
to rebuild is now underway. In Lebanon, the newly-appointed prime
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minister, Rafik al Hariri, is heading an ambitious program.
Hariri is a long-standing friend of the Saudi royal family. He
has won significant pledges of aid from them, which has led to
other pledges of support from Europe and elsewhere. With over $1
billion dollars committed so far, the campaign has already
commenced.
A scheme of such magnitude will produce jobs, many of which
will go to the Shias. With improved career chances will come
hope, and that, more than anything, is what the community needs
right now. The author believes that, were the Shias able to mend
their lives and fortunes, they would not fight with anyone.
Indeed, the recent decision of Hizbollah to field a slate of
candidates in the elections would appear to support this view.
The party (or at least a portion of it) appears to be turning its
back on Iran's crusade against the West, and preparing to assume
a role in Lebanese politics.
This brings us to the last issue we need to consider, the
question of U.S. policy in regard to this problem.
Recommendations.
This question of what stand to take on the issue of
negotiating a peace treaty with Assad is a difficult one.
However, it can be worked out, provided one knows how to approach
the problem. We can best illustrate this by citing the recent
visit to the United States by a delegation of Likud Party
politicians.
The Likud delegation came to lobby the U.S. Congress against
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supporting a settlement with Assad. Why, the Likud figures
argued, should Israel deal with an Arab head of state whose
regime supports terrorism? It is certainly the case that in the
past Assad was involved with various groups which clearly were
terrorist. The question is, is he so involved today?
The Likud delegation cited Assad's connections with
Hizbollah, which the delegates regard as indisputably a terrorist
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organization. This is a matter of debate. Hizbollah was terrorist
in the early 1980s when it seized hostages, blew up embassies and
assassinated politicians--all that was the work of men outside
the law, killers, thugs.
What is going on now in southern Lebanon, however, does not
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fall into that category. The guerrilla war is not terroristic,
in the sense that it targets IDF units and their SLA clients,
and, by and large, avoids involving civilians. This, however, is
beside the point. How to characterize Hizbollah is not important;
rather the focus should be on what the party can do.
The great difference between Hizbollah now and the way it
was in the early 1980s is that now it has the support of the Shia
community. Terrorists can plant bombs and shoot people from
around corners, and the community need never be involved, or even
approve of their actions. However, it is a different matter when
carrying on a guerrilla war; such activity cannot commence, much
less be sustained for any period, without considerable support
87
from a broad area of the population.
Earlier we explained that Hizbollah gained support by
providing the Shias with essential services. These services, to
be sure, are quite primitive. The clinics of Hizbollah are mere
store fronts; the schools are conducted in people's homes.
Nonetheless, for the time being this satisfies the community
because it has nothing better. The youths have no jobs, the
families have no security. Indeed, in the case of the Shias
actually living in the security zone, these people do not even
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have any internationally recognized status.
Hence, it should be obvious that what is really involved
here is economics. The problem of Hizbollah, and of Syria's
making peace with Israel, is not about terror (as the Likid
politicians would like U.S. policymakers to believe) but about
economics. How are the peoples of the area, namely the Arabs, to
make any kind of life for themselves under the difficult
conditions that presently prevail?
The youth of the area are not going to remain passive much
longer. Indeed, they are already starting to revolt, and
Hizbollah is positioned to exploit the crisis as it develops. We
mentioned above that the party had fielded candidates for the
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parliament, and that this should be seen as a move toward
moderation. At the same time, however, another wing of the party
has rejected this approach, and has continued to call for an allout fight against the Zionists. Effectively, it seems, the party
89
is split into radical and moderate wings. Both are well
organized and prepared to act; however, the leadership apparently
is delaying making a decision as to which course it will follow.
In the author's opinion Israel and the Arab governments have,
perhaps, another year to work out the modalities of a peace
settlement, so that they can then move to restoring the area's
economy. If there is no definite sign by the end of 1995 that
things are improving--that is, that there is a credible economic
revival underway--Hizbollah and all of the other radical
religious groups can be expected to react, becoming much more
radical and more violent. Once this occurs it is hopeless to
assume that the region will return to the path of moderation any
time soon.
U.S. policymakers should consider adopting a pragmatic
approach to the problem of peace with Assad, and insist that
Israel and Damascus make peace, as soon as possible. Then the
United States should support the agreement and promote it with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and whatever other
international lending bodies can be induced to contribute toward
this effort.
The worst thing U.S. policymakers can do at this juncture is
to assume that Assad is under the gun, that he must give way and
agree to peace on Israel's terms. Assad is not the petitioner
here. If necessary he will change strategies and find ways to
carry on the war--even the possibility of a Baghdad- TehranDamascus axis should not be ruled out.
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bankrolled the Israelis, even indirectly. After the Arab oil
embargo, however, they began investing their petro dollars
downstream and now have a material interest in preserving the
health of the world financial system. Thus they are closer to
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every Arab government in the Middle East operates this way. This
is true, and it concerns the Israelis, who ask, what will happen
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Pity the Poor Nation.
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Washington Post, November 17, 1994.
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up of the Jewish cultural center in Argentina. That certainly was
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upwards of 29 Muslims during a religious service in Hebron. In
effect, the guerrillas are claiming to retaliate in kind--terror
for terror.
87. This should be obvious. In the case of southern Lebanon,
the guerrillas operate in territory over which the IDF has
control. The Israelis have the will to coerce the community into
telling them who are the guerrillas in their midst, and yet the
resistance goes on. This can mean only one of two things--either
the guerrillas have so terrorized the people they dare not talk,
or else they support the guerrillas. Either way the movement is
successful, inasmuch as it has gained the ability to operate
among the people, which is the test of any such movement.
88. Guilain Denoeux in Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A
Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and
Lebanon, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993,
says (p. 116) that ". . . the clientelist system in Beirut proved
incapable of assimilating the constant flow of Shia rural
migrants, largely as a result of a key provision in the electoral
law, according to which one votes not where one lives, but in the
constituency of one's birthplace . . . under such circumstances,
no Beirut za'im (ward boss, ed.) would perform for a constituency
that was in no position to reciprocate through its vote."
89. For background on the split, see Kenneth Katzman,
Hizbollah: A Radical Militia in Lebanon, Washington, DC: CRS
Report for Congress, October 7, 1993.
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